Introduction
The last decade has seen the development of various reasoning systems which are specialised in specific problem domains. Theorem proving contests, such as the annual CASC 1 competition, have shown that these systems typically perform well in particular niches but often do poorly in others. First-order provers, for instance, cannot be used to prove higher-order problem formulations. Deduction systems in general are very weak in carrying out computations, 
Cooperation via a single inference rule
In the generic approach described above, the cooperation between systems is achieved at the upper layer of the OANTS architecture, by modelling each system as a separate inference rule. A more refined approach, first presented in [11] , fosters cooperation by exploiting the lower layer of the OANTS blackboard architecture. This effectively cuts out the need to communicate via the central proof object, and therefore offers the advantage of a more succinct exchange of intermediate results between the systems involved, in a specialist language.
Direct bilateral integration of two reasoning systems is generally difficult if both systems do not share representation formalisms that are sufficiently similar. It also requires at least one of the systems involved to be open, such that it can continuously incorporate results of another system during its own run. Finally, the effort of implementing a dedicated inference rule for the communication of two particular types of reasoning systems is more involved than simply integrating a system and its results into OANTS's central architecture. It is therefore, necessary to carefully consider if a bilateral integration actually promises a gain in reasoning power of the overall system-see Section 4 for a detailed case study that empirically evaluates this specialist integration.
We realised the specialist approach discussed here by using a single inference rule to model the cooperation between the higher-order resolution prover LEO [8] and a first-order theorem prover in OANTS. The cooperation between the provers is enabled by directly exchanging sets of clauses without translating them into single formulae and back. The general idea is that LEO sends the subset of its clauses that do not contain any 'real' higher-order sub-terms (such as a λ-abstraction or embedded equations) to a first-order theorem prover. We call clauses of this sort FO-like clauses. In detail, the single inference rule needs four arguments to be applicable: (1) an open proof goal, (2) a partial LEO proof, (3) a set of FO-like clauses in the partial proof, (4) a first-order refutation proof for the set of FO-like clauses.
Each of these arguments is computed, that is, its instantiation is found, by an independent process. The first process finds open goals in the central proof object and posts them on the blackboard associated with the new rule. The second process starts an instance of the LEO theorem prover for each new open goal on the blackboard. Each LEO instance maintains its own set of FO-like clauses. The third process monitors these clauses, and as soon as it detects a change in this set, that is, if new FO-like clauses are added by LEO, it writes the entire set of clauses to the blackboard. Once FOlike clauses are posted, the fourth process first translates each of the clauses directly into a corresponding one in the format of the first-order theorem prover, and then starts the first-order theorem prover on them. Note that translating FO-like clauses directly is far more efficient than translating them first into single, fully quantified formulae in the central higher-order proof object. As soon as either LEO or the first-order prover finds a refutation, the second process reports LEO's proof or partial proof to the blackboard, that is, it instantiates argument (2) . Once all four arguments of our inference rule are instantiated, the rule can be applied and the open proof goal can be closed in the central proof object. That is, the open goal can be proved by the cooperation between LEO and a first-order theorem prover. When computing applicability of the inference rule, the second and the fourth process concurrently spawn processes running LEO or a first-order prover on a different set of FO-like clauses. Thus, when actually applying the inference rule, all these instances of provers working on the same open subgoal are stopped.
The cooperation can be carried out between any first-order theorem prover and LEO instantiated with any strategy, thus resulting in different instantiations of the inference rule discussed above. Several first-order provers are integrated in OANTS and could be used, but in the case study that evaluates this approach (see Section 4) we used concretely BLIKSEM [17] and VAMPIRE [32] . In most cases, more than one process running a first-order ATP was necessary. This is because the subsets of FO-like clauses generated by LEO in its first reasoning loops are usually still consistent and they become inconsistent only after several reasoning rounds in which new FO-like clauses are generated. Each time the subset of FO-like clauses in LEO's search space changes, a new process running a first-order ATP is started. In contrast to the many processes running first-order ATPs only one process running LEO is started. Crucial to the success of the integration was also the possibility of retrieving intermediate results from LEO that are sufficiently informative for the first-order prover. Since LEO's standard calculus intrinsically avoids primitive equality and instead provides a rule that replaces occurrences of primitive equality with their corresponding Leibniz definitions, which are higher-order, we had to forgo this optimisation and add all the clauses with primitive equality to the intermediate results. See [11] for more details on this aspect of the integration.
Our approach to the cooperation between a higher-order and a first-order theorem prover has many advantages. The main one is that the communication is restricted to the transmission of clauses, and thus it avoids intermediate translation into the language of the central proof object. This significantly reduces the communication overhead and makes effective proving of more involved theorems feasible. In fact, many theorems that would be difficult to prove or even not provable at all in reasonable time due to communication overhead in the generic architecture that uses a centralised communication, are now provable with this specialist architecture that decentralises communication-see the results of the case study in Section 4.3. A disadvantage of this approach is that we cannot easily translate and integrate the two proof objects produced by LEO and BLIKSEM, or LEO and VAMPIRE into the central proof object maintained by OANTS, as is possible when applying only one prover per open subgoal. The repercussions will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.
In the following two sections we will demonstrate the effectiveness of both integration approaches-the generic integration of arbitrary reasoning systems on the top layer of OANTS, and the specialist integration of a higher-order and a first-order resolution prover on the lower layer of OANTS-with example applications from diverse mathematical domains.
Generic integration of reasoning systems
In this section we present several application examples of the generic integration architecture as presented in Section 2.1. The examples demonstrate the ease of integration of systems in our architecture, the power of such cooperative architecture, and the diversity of examples that the combined systems can tackle.
In particular, we demonstrate the complementary interplay of theorem provers and model generators to decide validity of conditional and unconditional set-equalities as well as set-inequalities (Section 3.1.1). Our previous case studies further show the cooperation between an automated theorem prover and a computer algebra system on problems in sets over naturals (Section 3.1.2), and the collaboration of a higher-order and a first-order prover on group theory examples (Section 3.1.3). We then consider theoretical properties such as soundness and completeness for each case study (Section 3.2), and analyse their results (Section 3.3) to show that our novel cooperative solution achieves a much higher reliability and coverage than the standard single reasoning system approach.
Test problems
The test problems we chose for our three case studies are diverse and demonstrate the breadth and power of our cooperative reasoning approach. Pure set equalities have been previously investigated in [7] . Here in Section 3.1.1, we extend the case study to set inequalities, as well as set equalities and inequalities under additional conditions. The test problems in Section 3.1.2 on sets over naturals have in part previously appeared in [7] . The test problems in Section 3.1.3 in group theory have in part previously appeared in [36] .
Conditional and unconditional set-equalities and set-inequalities
The examples in this section are concerned with checking the validity or invalidity of statements about set relations. This case study demonstrates the cooperation between higher-order ATP, first-order ATP and a model generator. The task at hand is to construct either a proof or a counterexample. Both are handled in a similar fashion by our system. First, simple natural deduction agents reduce the set equalities to a propositional logic statement. The resulting statements are then picked up by a propositional logic agent employing the theorem prover VAMPIRE and a counterexample agent using the model generator PARADOX. The logic statement is then either proved or disproved. Thus, valid and invalid statements are tackled analogously in all but the last step.
The test problems we consider are universally quantified statements involving equality, inequality, or the subset relations between sets constructed with the simple set operations ∩, ∪, \ that represent intersection, union, and set-difference, respectively. Moreover, to widen the coverage to extreme ends of the spectrum of test problems, we consider additional conditions on the relationships between the sets involved. In particular, we explicitly express uniqueness or disjointness of particular sets.
As concrete examples of two set equalities whose validity/invalidity is to be decided, consider the proof or refutation of the following simple, unconditional statements:
Further elimination of universally quantified variables and subsequent definition expansions of the operations ∪, ∩ and ∈, with a ∪ b :
, and u ∈ a := a(u) reduces that goal finally to
which contains no variables and which is trivial to prove for any propositional logic prover. In case (2) we analogously derive
but now there exists a counterexample of the form
This counterexample can be easily constructed by a model generator.
Sets over naturals
The test problems in this case study consider sets over naturals, and demonstrate the cooperation between theorem provers and computer algebra systems. The problems themselves are mathematically trivial, but require a combination of deduction and computation to solve them. While the reasoning itself is relatively shallow, the problems can generally not be solved by a theorem prover alone as the contained functions need to be treated with symbolic or numerical computation that is out of reach of provers. In our architecture the problems are tackled by a collaboration of the higher-order theorem prover LEO, the first-order theorem prover OTTER, and the computer algebra system MAPLE.
A concrete example of these test problems is the following equation:
In order to tackle it, it is necessary to first simplify the numerical functions contained, that is gcd and lcm, and then rewrite the set representations on either side of the equality. The first step is carried out by a simplification agent which links the computer algebra system MAPLE to the core system. As an application condition, this agent checks whether the current subgoal contains certain simplifiable expressions. If so, it simplifies the subgoal by sending the simplifiable sub-terms (e.g., x > gcd (10, 8) ) to MAPLE and replaces them with the corresponding simplified terms (e.g., x > 2). Hence, the new subgoal suggested by the simplification agent is, e.g.: (λx x > 2 ∧ x < 40) = (λx x < 40) ∩ (λx x > 2). Since no other agent comes up with a better alternative, this suggestion is selected and executed. Subsequently, the LEO agent successfully attacks the new goal after expanding the definition of ∩. This particular problem can, after MAPLE's contribution, be proved by LEO alone. In other cases MAPLE's contribution may lead to a problem which can be solved only by a further collaboration between LEO and a first-order ATP.
Group theory and algebra
The test problems in this case study involve theorems from group theory and algebra, and are mainly about the equivalence of definitions and uniqueness statements. This case study demonstrates the cooperation between higherorder and first-order ATPs. Since the problems contain some rather elaborate higher-order constructions, they cannot be tackled by a first-order theorem prover alone. Instead, they are solved by a goal directed higher-order natural deduction proof search in cooperation with a first-order automated theorem prover.
The group theory and algebra examples that we examined are rather easy from a mathematical viewpoint, however, can become non-trivial when painstakingly formalised. An example are proofs in which particular elements of one mathematical structure have to be identified by their properties and transferred to their appropriate counterparts in an enriched structure. The equivalence statement:
where the unit element of the monoid has to be identified with the appropriate element of the group, is in this category. Here, Group and Monoid refer to a definition of a group and a monoid, respectively. Inverses(M, , Unit(M, )) is a predicate stating that every element of M has an inverse element with respect to the operation and the identity Unit(M, ). Unit(M, ) itself is a way to refer to that unique element of M that has the identity property.
In higher-order logic this can be formalised most elegantly using the description operator ι (cf. [1] for definition in higher-order logics), by assigning to the element in the group the unique element in the monoid that has exactly the same properties. In the context of our examples, we employed a description that encodes concepts like the (unique) unit element of a group by a single term that locally embodies the particular properties of the encoded concept itself. If any property of the unit element is required in a proof, then the description operator has to be unfolded (by applying a tactic in the system) and a uniqueness subproof has to be carried out.
The idea of the proofs is to divide the problems into smaller chunks that can be solved by automated theorem provers, and if necessary, to deal with formulae involving description. The ND search procedure implemented in OANTS has the task to simplify in turn the given formulae by expanding definitions and applying ND inferences. After each proof step the provers try to solve the introduced subproblems. If they all fail within the given resources (typically time limit), the system proceeds with the alternative ND inferences and subsequently the provers try to tackle the new subproblems introduced by them.
When a point is reached during the proof where neither applicable rules nor solutions from the provers are available, but the description operator still occurs in the considered problem, two theorems are applied to eliminate description. Description in goals is eliminated with the theorem
Since the reverse direction of the above theorem does not necessarily hold (as with QιP we cannot assume that P actually uniquely describes an element), we use the theorem
] to eliminate occurrences of description in forward reasoning direction. The results of description elimination are generally very large formulae, which can then again be tackled with the ND rules and the theorem provers.
Theoretical considerations
For the integration of multiple reasoning systems to construct a single, coherent proof, it is particularly crucial to consider the soundness of such an integration. In the case of combining different theorem provers (like in the case study in group theory examples in Section 3.1.3), this is mainly a question of compatibility and connectability of the respective calculi. We will shed more light on soundness and completeness considerations when presenting specialist integration of first-order and higher-order reasoners in Section 4.2. However, in the case of integrating more general computations into the reasoning process, for instance, as in our case with a computer algebra system or a model generator, soundness issues have to be considered case by case.
The use of a counterexample generator as presented in Section 3.1.1 is sound if and only if the full problem is given to the counterexample generator. Note that it is not sufficient to give to the counterexample generator only some of the axioms and not others, since this may transform an inconsistent set into a consistent one. In general the original problem is initially transformed into an equivalent problem that is given in parallel to a first-order theorem prover and a first-order model generator. The original problem is proved if the first-order theorem prover finds a refutation, and falsified if the first-order model generator finds a counterexample. Since the original transformation preserves (un-)satisfiability the approach is sound.
Soundness of the solutions for the problems in Section 3.1.2 depends crucially on soundness of the computations by the computer algebra system. This is not guaranteed, as MAPLE, like most other computer algebra systems, is not provably correct, and also does not provide an explicit justification for its computations. Consequently, correctness has to be ensured explicitly by certifying the computations after the proof has been found. This is achieved by constructing justifications on the calculus level-see [35] for details.
We cannot guarantee completeness neither in integrating a model generator nor a computer algebra system. A finite model generator is by its very nature incomplete. Similarly, a computer algebra system only provides a limited library of algorithms and generally has some limitations with respect to the size of its integer computations.
Results

Conditional and unconditional set-equalities and set-inequalities
We carried out a case study with an automatically and randomly generated test-bed of examples consisting of set statements involving equality, inequality and subset as relations, and ∩, ∪, \ as functions that combine a maximum Table 1 Summary of the results of the experiments with set expressions of 6 universally quantified variables up to a nesting depth of 6. For our experiments we generated 100 basic (i.e., unconditional) statements. All 100 statements are listed in Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A. Given these 100 statements we then added conditions on the relationship between the universally quantified sets. In detail, we devised three types of formulae that can be viewed as the extreme positions of these conditions, by taking the set statement
(1) without assumptions, or unconditional, for example:
under all different, that is, the uniqueness assumption, for example:
(3) under pairwise disjoint, or disjointness, assumption, for example:
Note that there are formulae in the first class, such as ∀x 1 , x 2 (x 1 \x 2 ) ∪ (x 2 \x 1 ) = ∅, which are non-theorems but are theorems in the second; or non-theorems in the first class such as ∀x 1 , x 2 x 1 \x 2 = x 1 , but theorems in the third. Thus we carried out three sets of experiments, each with 100 problems. Each problem was then attempted to be proved by the theorem prover VAMPIRE, the model generator PARADOX, and OANTS separately within a two minutes time limit. If a system could not solve the problem within the given time, it was classified as a failed attempt. However, we distinguish between two types of failure, depending on the validity of the problem: VAMPIRE fails if it cannot prove a valid statement, whereas it is obviously not expected to solve an invalid statement. Conversely, PARADOX fails if it cannot find a model for an invalid statement. OANTS, on the other hand, is expected to solve all problems, thus there is only one type of failure possible.
A summary of the results is given in Table 1 . It presents the number of valid and invalid set statements in each of the three experiments, followed by the number of problems VAMPIRE, PARADOX, and OANTS could or could not solve, respectively. Observe that for VAMPIRE and PARADOX figures for the two types of failure are given, separated by a dashed bar, where the first figure indicates the number of problems the system was indeed expected to solve. Each experiment is further broken down in the number of statements involving set equality, subset relation, and inequality. The full results for all three experiments are listed in Tables A.3 , A.4, and A.5 in Appendix A.
The results in Table 1 present a mixed picture. In the case of unconditional statements the results are straightforward. PARADOX easily finds models for all invalid statements and VAMPIRE proves all valid statements except for the two involving equality. In the experiments with uniqueness condition, however, both PARADOX and VAMPIRE have considerably more problems. VAMPIRE cannot prove any statements with equality or subset relation, and only 
proves 3 out of 6 of the inequality statements. Similarly, PARADOX fails to find models for the majority of statements with uniqueness condition, in particular it cannot find models for any of the invalid inequality statements. For statements with disjointness condition, PARADOX does better than VAMPIRE as it finds models for all invalid statements, whereas VAMPIRE can only prove a fraction of the valid statements. In contrast, OANTS can solve all problems, regardless of precondition, and can also decide on their validity and invalidity, as it integrates both theorem proving and model generation. For the unconditional statements this is not as impressive, since using both, PARADOX and VAMPIRE, without integration one after another on all problems, is almost as powerful as OANTS. In fact, the timings in Table A .3 reveal that OANTS is slower due to communication overheads. On the other hand, for the conditional problems, OANTS is the only reliable way of distinguishing valid and invalid statements for all considered problems. Thus, the combined systems in OANTS have a considerably broader coverage of the problem domain than the single reasoning systems alone.
Sets over naturals
We experimented with 50 problems of sets over naturals. They all involved some element of computation, which was mainly concerned with natural number arithmetic, but also contained simple number theoretic functions such as gcd, lcm, and absolute value function. All of the problems could successfully be solved by the combination of first-order and higher-order reasoning and computer algebra simplification. As current automated theorem provers are comparatively weak in integer arithmetic and the formalisation of functions like lcm or gcd is very involved, they are likely to be outperformed by a combined system like OANTS, and hence, we did not carry out a comparison of OANTS with any specific automated theorem proving system.
Group theory and algebra
In our case study on group theory and algebra problems we have successfully experimented with 20 examples of the described type, of which we could solve 11 automatically. A direct comparison with first-order provers alone is superfluous, as in a purely first-order formulation quantified operations would have to be pre-instantiated appropriately. This would, however, defeat the purpose of showing equivalence of definitions that define different operations on a set.
There is still quite a number of problems which, while considered very easy for humans, cannot be solved automatically. As a simple example of a problem that could not be solved, consider proving the equivalence between two different definitions of a group. One definition is the standard one, that is, a group is a set G with an associative operation •, such that there exists a neutral element for • and each element has an inverse with respect to that neutral element. The alternative, equivalent definition axiomatises a group as a set G with an operation /, such that for all
The main difficulty in the proof of this equivalence is to find the right reformulations between the two operations • and /, since they cannot be simply equated. While in most of the other examples, higher-order unification can actually find the right equation between the operations in question, the complexity of the reformulation needed in this example would require a primitive substitution mechanism [3] that can handle the description operator. However, this is currently beyond automation.
Summary of results
Our integration approach has proved successful in different ways. Firstly, it provides a flexible means to integrate heterogeneous systems, especially those that are designed with diverse and even opposite functionality. The integrated system can solve tasks such as deciding the validity or invalidity of logical statements that can normally be done only by using several separate systems, or they cannot be proved at all with a single specialist system. Secondly, OANTS' range and coverage of solvable problems is far greater than that of any individual system alone. In particular, OANTS can formulate problems with the expressive power of a higher-order language, and is able to simplify problems in a goal-directed way either by using its own built-in calculus rules or by exploiting the computational power of other integrated systems (such as computer algebra) before handing them to dedicated first-order systems. And hence, thirdly, OANTS proves theorems in a significantly more reliable way than the individual systems.
While the approach described in this section is generic and allows to integrate several systems in a consistent and easy way, it leads to a computational overhead which in some cases makes proof search prohibitively expensive. In particular, experiments on integrating higher-order with first-order reasoners have shown that some problems quickly 
reach sizes that make their translation via the OANTS central formalism computationally infeasible. This suggested a much tighter integration between component systems that cuts out overhead. In particular, it has led to the development of the specialist integration of reasoning systems for higher-order and first-order reasoners, which we describe and evaluate in the next section.
Specialist integration of reasoning systems
We now carry out a case study in which we empirically evaluate the power and efficiency of the specialist integration of reasoning systems described in Section 2.2. We are particularly interested in the higher-order/first-order ATP cooperation. Some of the results of this case study were previously reported in [11] .
Existing higher-order ATPs generally exhibit shortcomings in efficiently reasoning with first-order problems for several reasons. Unlike in the case of first-order provers, for which sophisticated calculi and strategies, as well as advanced implementation techniques, such as term indexing [34] , have been developed, fully mechanisable higherorder calculi are still at a comparably early stage of development. Some problems are much harder in higher-order, for instance, unification is undecidable, strong constraining term-and literal-orderings are not available, extensionality reasoning and set variable instantiation have to be addressed. Nevertheless, for some mathematical problem domains, such as naive set theory, for instance, automated higher-order reasoning performs very well. Our motivation therefore is to combine the best of the two approaches in a specialist integration.
Test problems
We motivate the need for linking higher-order and first-order ATPs with some examples from Table 2 . It contains a range of challenging problems taken from the TPTP [37] , against which we will evaluate our system in Section 4.3. The selection is inspired by the one given in [21] but contains some additional problems. 3 The problems are given by the identifiers used in the SET domain of the TPTP-v3.0.1, and are formalised in a variant of Church's simply typed λ-calculus with prefix polymorphism. In classical type theory, terms and all their sub-terms are typed. Polymorphism allows the introduction of type variables such that statements can be made for all types. For instance, in problem SET014 + 4 the universally quantified variable X oα denotes a mapping from objects of type α to objects of type o. We use Church's notation oα, which stands for the functional type α → o. The reader is referred to [2] for a more detailed introduction. In the remainder, o will denote the type of truth values, and small Greek letters will denote arbitrary types. Thus, X oα (resp. its η-longform λy α Xy) is actually a characteristic function denoting the set of elements of type α, for which the predicate associated with X holds. As further notational convention, we use capital letter variables to denote sets, functions, or relations, while lower case letters denote individuals. Types are usually only given in the first occurrence of a variable and omitted if inferable from the context. The test problems in Table 2 employ defined concepts that are specified in a knowledge base of hierarchical theories that LEO has access to. All concepts necessary for defining our problems in Table 2 are given in Table 3 . Concepts are defined in terms of λ-expressions and they may contain other, already specified concepts. For presentation purposes, we use customary mathematical symbols ∪, ∩, etc., for some concepts like union, intersection, etc., and we also use infix notation. For instance, the definition of union on sets can be easily read in its more common mathematical representation A ∪ B := {x | x ∈ A ∨ x ∈ B}. Before proving a problem, LEO always expands-recursively, if necessary-all occurring concepts. This straightforward expansion to first principles is realised by an automated preprocess in our current approach.
We present different example problems which demonstrate the main features of our specialist integration approach. We first discuss example SET171 + 3 to contrast our formalisation to a standard first-order one. SET171 + 3 After recursively expanding the input problem, that is, completely reducing it to first principles, LEO turns it into a negated unit clause. Since this initial clause is not in normal form, LEO first normalises it with explicit clause normalisation rules to reach some proper initial clauses. In our case, this normalisation process leads to the following unit clause consisting of a (syntactically not solvable) unification constraint (here B oα , C oα 
and Bx is obtained from expansion of x ∈ B):
Note that negated primitive equations are generally automatically converted by LEO into unification constraints. This is why Table 3 Defined concepts occurring in test problems from Table 2 Defined notions in theory typed set
Defined notions in theory relation
Defined notions in theory function
by the negative literal (where x is a Skolem constant):
This unit clause is again not normal; normalisation, factorisation and subsumption yield the following set of clauses:
[Bx]
This set is essentially of propositional logic character and trivially refutable. LEO needs 0.56 seconds for solving the problem and generates a total of 36 clauses. Let us consider now this same example SET171 + 3 in its first-order formulation from the TPTP (see Table 4 ). We can observe that the assumptions provide only a partial axiomatisation of naive set theory. On the other hand, the specification introduces lemmas that are useful for solving the problem. In particular, assumption (7) is trivially derivable from (3) with (6) . Obviously, clausal normalisation of this first-order problem description yields a much larger and more difficult set of clauses. It is therefore not surprising that most first-order ATPs fail to prove this Table 4 TPTP problem SET171 + 3-distributivity of ∪ over ∩ Assumptions:
problem. Of course, the significance of the comparison is clearly limited, because different systems are optimised to a different degree. Moreover, first-order systems often use a case tailored problem representation (e.g., by avoiding some base axioms of the addressed theory), while the higher-order prover has a harder task of dealing with a general (not specifically tailored) representation that does not make any assumptions about which parts of the theory are or are not needed for the concrete problem at hand. We use λ-abstraction as well as the extensionality treatment inherent in LEO's calculus [5] . This enables a theoretically 4 Henkin-complete proof system for set theory. In the above example SET171 + 3, LEO generally uses the application of functional extensionality to push extensional unification constraints down to base type level, and then eventually applies Boolean extensionality to generate clauses from them. These are typically much simpler and often even propositional-like or FO-like, and are therefore suitable for treatment by a first-order ATP or even a propositional logic decision procedure. SET624 + 3. Sometimes, extensionality treatment is not required and the originally higher-order problem is immediately reduced to only FO-like clauses. For example, after expanding the definitions, problem SET624 + 3 yields the following clause (where B oα , C oα , D oα are again Skolem constants):
Normalisation results in 26 FO-like clauses, which present a hard problem for LEO: it needs approx. 35 seconds (see Section 4.3) to find a refutation, whereas first-order ATPs only need a fraction of a second. SET646 + 3. Sometimes, problems are immediately refuted after the initial clause normalisation. For example, we get the following clause after definition expansion in problem SET646 + 3 (where B oα , C oα , x α are again Skolem constants): 
SET611 + 3.
The examples discussed so far all essentially apply extensionality treatment and normalisation to the input problem in order to immediately generate a set of inconsistent FO-like clauses. Problem SET611 + 3 is more complicated as it requires several reasoning steps in LEO before the initially consistent set of available FO-like clauses grows into an inconsistent one. After definition expansion, LEO is first given the input clause:
which it normalises into: 
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As mentioned before, the unification constraint (9) corresponds to:
F LEO has to apply to each of these clauses and to each of their literals appropriate extensionality rules. Thus, several rounds of LEO's set-of-support-based reasoning procedure are required, so that all necessary extensionality reasoning steps are performed, and sufficiently many FO-like clauses are generated which can be refuted by a first-order ATP. In summary, each of the examples discussed in this section exposes a motivation for our higher-order/first-order cooperative approach to theorem proving. In particular, they show that:
• Higher-order formulations allow for a concise problem representation which often allows easier and faster proof search than first-order formulations.
• Higher-order problems can often be reduced to a set of first-order clauses that can be more efficiently handled by a first-order ATP.
• Some problems are trivially refutable after clause normalisation.
• Some problems require in-depth higher-order reasoning before a refutable first-order clause set can be extracted.
Theoretical considerations
Clearly, soundness and completeness properties depend on the corresponding properties of the systems involved, in our case, of LEO and BLIKSEM or VAMPIRE, respectively.
Soundness: The general philosophy of OANTS is to ensure the correctness of proofs by the generation of explicit proof objects, which can be checked independently from the proof generation. In particular, reasoning steps of ATPs have to be translated into OANTS's natural deduction calculus via the TRAMP proof transformation system [25] to be machine-checkable. Because of the tight integration of LEO with the first-order ATPs, in which FO-like clauses that are in LEO's search space are directly picked up by the processes running first-order ATPs, some essential information needed for TRAMP is not available. Thus the cooperative proof results of LEO-BLIKSEM or LEO-VAMPIRE cannot yet be translated and inserted into the centralised proof object and the generation of a machine-checkable proof object is not yet fully supported. One possible solution we propose is to translate the first-order proofs into LEO proofs and to insert them at the right places. Then, the modified LEO proofs can be inserted into the centralised proof object, and hence, explicit proof objects can be generated by OANTS.
While there are many advantages in guaranteeing correctness of proofs by checking them, it is worth noting that the combination of LEO and BLIKSEM (or LEO and VAMPIRE) is sound under the assumption that the three systems are sound. Namely, to prove a theorem it is sufficient to show that a subset of clauses generated in the proof is inconsistent. If LEO generates an inconsistent set of clauses, then it does so correctly by assumption, be it a FO-like set or not. Assuming that the translation from FO-like clauses to truly first-order clauses preserves consistency/inconsistency, then a set of clauses that is given to BLIKSEM (or VAMPIRE) is inconsistent only if LEO generated an inconsistent set of clauses in the first place. By the assumption that BLIKSEM (or VAMPIRE) is sound follows that it will only generate the empty clause when the original clause set was inconsistent.
Thus, soundness of our cooperative approach critically relies only on the soundness of the selected transformational mapping from FO-like clauses to proper first-order clauses. We use the mapping from TRAMP, which has been previously shown to be sound and is based on [23] . It injectively maps expressions such as P (f (a)) to expressions such as @ 1 pred (P , @ 1 fun (f, a) ), where the @ are new first-order operators describing function and predicate application for particular types and arities. The injectivity of the mapping guarantees soundness, since it allows each proof step to be mapped back from first-order to higher-order. Hence, our higher-order/first-order cooperative approach between LEO and BLIKSEM (or VAMPIRE) is sound.
Completeness: Completeness (in the sense of Henkin completeness) can in principle be achieved in higher-order systems, but practically, the strategies used are typically not complete for efficiency reasons. Let us assume that we use a complete strategy in LEO. All that our procedure does is pass FO-like clauses to BLIKSEM (or VAMPIRE). Hence, no proofs can be lost in this process. That is, completeness follows trivially from the completeness of LEO.
The more interesting question is whether particular cooperation strategies will be complete as well. For instance, in LEO we may want to give higher preference to real higher-order steps which guarantee the generation of first-order clauses. 
Results
We conducted several experiments to evaluate our cooperative reasoning approach. In particular, we concentrated on test problems given in Table 2 . We investigated several LEO strategies in order to compare LEO's individual performance with the performance of the LEO-BLIKSEM and the LEO-VAMPIRE cooperation. Some of LEO's results were already published in [4, 8] , and some of LEO-BLIKSEM results were previously presented in [11] . We also compare our results to those of the most successful first-order systems on these test problems as given in the TPTP and in the literature. These were, in detail:
MUSCADET (v2.4) a natural deduction system that uses special inference rules for sets [31] , E-SETHEO (csp04) that combines a variety of first-order theorem provers and specialised decision procedures into a single proof engine exploiting strategy parallelism [28] , VAMPIRE (v7.0) a first-order theorem prover using a binary resolution and superposition based calculus [32] , SATURATE an extension of VAMPIRE with Boolean extensionality rules that are a one-to-one correspondence to LEO's rules for Extensional Higher-Order Paramodulation [21] . Table 5 presents the results of our experiments. The first column contains the TPTP identifier of the problem. The second column lists the TPTP difficulty rating of the problem, which indicates how hard the problem is for first-order ATPs (difficulty rating 1.00 indicates that no TPTP prover can solve the problem). The third, fourth, and fifth columns list whether SATURATE, MUSCADET and E-SETHEO, respectively, can (+) or cannot (-) solve a problem. The sixth column lists the timing results for VAMPIRE. All timings given in the table are in seconds. Since the results for SATURATE are taken from [21] (a '?' in Table 5 indicates that the result was not listed in [21] and is thus unavailable) and the results for MUSCADET and E-SETHEO are taken directly from the on-line version of the TPTP, a run-time comparison would be unfair as the times are measured on different platforms. The timings for VAMPIRE, on the other hand, are based on private communication with A. Voronkov. They were obtained on a computer with a very similar specification to the one we used, namely a 2.4 GHz Xenon machine with 1 GB of memory. The remaining three major columns: LEO, LEO-BLIKSEM, and LEO-VAMPIRE detail the results of our experiments. Each of these three columns is further divided into sub-columns to allow for a detailed comparison.
For our experiments with LEO alone in column seven in Table 5 we tested four different strategies. Mainly, they differ in their treatment of equality and extensionality. This ranges from immediate expansion of primitive equality with Leibniz equality and limited extensionality reasoning, STANDARD (ST), to immediate expansion of primitive equality and moderate extensionality reasoning, EXT, to delayed expansion of primitive equality and moderate extensionality reasoning, EXT-INPUT (EI), and finally to delayed expansion of primitive equality and advanced recursive extensionality reasoning, EXT-INPUT-RECURSIVE (EIR). Column seven (LEO) in Table 5 presents the fastest strategy for each problem (Strat.), the number of clauses generated by LEO (Cl.), and the total run-time (Time). While occasionally there was more than one LEO strategy that could solve a problem, it should be noted that none of the strategies was successful for all the problems solved by LEO. In contrast to the experiments with LEO alone, we used only the EXT-INPUT strategy for our experiments with the LEO-BLIKSEM and LEO-VAMPIRE. 5 Each of column eight (LEO-BLIKSEM) and nine (LEO-VAMPIRE) in Table 5 presents the number of clauses generated by LEO (Cl.) together with the time (Time), and in addition, the number of first-order clauses (FOcl) sent to, the time (FOtm) used by, and the number of clauses generated (GnCl) by BLIKSEM and VAMPIRE, respectively.
The overall time limit of all experiments was 100 seconds for both LEO alone and the LEO-first-order cooperations. This time also includes the time needed to write and process input and output files over the network. While LEO and instances of BLIKSEM or VAMPIRE were running in separate threads (each run of BLIKSEM and VAMPIRE was given 50 seconds), the figures given in the 'Time' column reflect the overall time needed for a successful proof. That is, they contain the time needed by all concurrent processes: LEO's own process as well as those processes administering the various instances of BLIKSEM or VAMPIRE. However, during I/O operations (i.e., writing input files and reading output files of the provers) the threads were locked and could only be killed once the operation was completed. While these operations generally only took milliseconds, for particular large files this could take longer, which accounts for Table 5 Experimental data for the benchmark test problems given in Table 2 TPTPProblem 
the more than 500 s needed by LEO-VAMPIRE on problem SET752+4. Since all processes ran on a single processor, there is potential to improve upon run times by using real multiprocessing. Note also, that the number of clauses in LEO's search space is typically low as subsumption is enabled. Subsumption, however, was not enabled for the accumulation of FO-like clauses in LEO's bag of FO-like clauses. This is why there are usually more clauses in this bag (which is sent to BLIKSEM or VAMPIRE) than there are in LEO's search space. Finally, observe that some problems were refuted after LEO's clausal normalisation, and hence BLIKSEM or VAMPIRE was not applicable (N/A). The results in columns three through six indicate that some problems are still very hard for first-order ATPs, as well as for the special purpose theorem prover MUSCADET. While LEO itself can solve a majority of these problems with some strategy, the LEO-BLIKSEM and LEO-VAMPIRE cooperations can solve more problems and, moreover, need only a single LEO strategy. We can also observe that many problems that appear to be relatively hard for LEO alone (e.g., SET017 + 1, SET611 + 3, SET624 + 3), are not only more quickly solved in the cooperative approach, but are often reduced to a relatively small higher-order preprocessing step with subsequent easy first-order proofs, as for instance, in the case of SET017 + 1. When comparing LEO-BLIKSEM and LEO-VAMPIRE one can observe that neither is clearly better than the other. Both cooperations solve the respective sub-problems very quickly, and it depends on the problem as to which one finds a solution earlier in the proof search. Moreover, the number of clauses produced during proof search for BLIKSEM and VAMPIRE can vary significantly. This suggests that in general, it is advantageous to integrate more than one first-order prover into the cooperative multi-agent architecture. From a mathematical viewpoint the investigated problems are easy and, hence, they should ideally be reliably and very efficiently solvable within a proof assistant. This has been achieved for the examples in Table 5 (except for SET770 + 4) by our cooperative approach. While some of the proof attempts now require slightly more time than when using LEO alone with a specialised strategy, they are, in most cases, still faster than when proving with a first-order system.
Related work
There exist several systems that are related to ours from the point of view of integrating a number of reasoners in a cooperative environment. The main difference is that none of these integrate such a variety of diverse reasoning systems in a common cooperative and distributed framework. Here we outline commonalities and differences of some such systems with our work.
The integration of reasoners and reasoning strategies was pioneered in the TEAMWORK system [19] , which realises the cooperation of different reasoning strategies, and the TECHS system [18] , which realises a cooperation between a set of heterogeneous first-order theorem provers. Similar to our approach, partial results in TECHS are exchanged between the different theorem provers in form of clauses. The main difference to the work of Denzinger et al. (and other related architectures like [20] ) is that our system bridges not only between first-order theorem provers, but also between first-order ATPs, higher-order ATPs, computer algebra systems and model generators. Also, unlike in TECHS, we provide a declarative specification framework for modelling external systems as cooperating, concurrent processes that can be (re-)configured at run-time. Related is also the work of Hurd [22] which realises a generic interface between HOL and first-order theorem provers. It is similar to the solution previously achieved by TRAMP [25] in OMEGA, which serves as a basis for the sound integration of ATPs into OANTS. Both approaches pass essentially first-order clauses to first-order theorem provers and then translate their results back into HOL resp. OMEGA. Some further related work on the cooperation of ISABELLE and first-order ATPs is presented in [26, 27] . The main difference of our work to the related systems is that while our system calls first-order provers from within automatic higher-order proof search, this is not the case for [22, [25] [26] [27] .
More generally, our cooperative, distributed and multi-agent framework is related to work on parallelism of deduction and other multi-agent architectures. The notion of parallelism in deduction has been categorised into three types [13] : parallelism on term level, on clause level and on search level. Our architecture models all three types. Parallelism on term level is clearly realised since our agents can access sub-terms in parallel during their search (for details of the OANTS suggestion mechanism, see [10] ). Parallelism on clause level is mainly concerned with term rewriting steps, which corresponds loosely to the application of tactics in our system, and this is already realised in our underlying OMEGA system. Parallelism on search level is one of the key criteria of our system, since in each step the search for the next applicable proof step, which is either a single tactic or the computations of an integrated reasoner, is parallelised.
Multi-agent aspects of our framework can be compared with respect to the characterisation of agents as autonomous and flexible computational entities that exhibit, to a varying degree, reactive, pro-active and social abilities [39, 40] . Our agents are clearly autonomous from a software engineering point of view, since they are implemented in concurrent threads. They are pro-active (i.e., they are not scheduled), reactive (i.e., their internal state is used to react to changes in the overall system) and robust. They cooperate, but do not exhibit any real social abilities, that is, they are not aware of other agents and individually cannot decide autonomously whom to cooperate with. They also have no real planning capabilities. From these points of view, our system is more closely related to distributed problem solving 
systems like HASP [30] and POLIGON [33] , rather than advanced layered agent architectures like INTERRAP [29] and the one by Bond and Gasser [14] .
Conclusion
We presented a general agent-based architecture that enables easy integration and cooperation of diverse and very heterogeneous systems like higher-order, first-order automated theorem provers, computer algebra systems and model generators. We showed how the integration of different reasoning systems can lead to a combined system which goes significantly beyond the capabilities of each individual system. For this we experimented with different forms of integration which can be achieved relatively easily in the OANTS-framework. OANTS provides a framework which enables a generic integration of a variety of systems, and is based on the construction of a common proof object. The results of our case studies in Section 3 demonstrate a stronger reliability and coverage of our system in comparison to other single specialist systems.
In the case of some specialist reasoning systems it pays off to integrate the different systems more tightly so that they can communicate more efficiently in a specialist language. The results of this case study in Section 4 provide evidence and support this, in particular they show the effectiveness of a specialist integration between a higher-order and first-order resolution theorem prover. Our non-optimised system outperforms state-of-the-art first-order theorem provers and their ad hoc extensions such as SATURATE [21] on 45 mathematical problems chosen from the TPTP SET category. Among them are four problems which cannot be solved by any TPTP system to date. In contrast to the first-order situation, these problems can in fact be proved in our approach reliably from first principles, that is, without avoiding relevant base axioms of the underlying set theory, and moreover, without the need to provide relevant lemmas and definitions by hand.
The results of our case study motivate further research in the automation of higher-order theorem proving and the experimentation with different higher-order to first-order transformation mappings (such as the ones used by [22, 26, 27] ) that support our hybrid reasoning approach. 6 They also provide further evidence for the usefulness of the OANTS approach as described in [7, 10] for flexibly modelling the cooperation of reasoning systems. The results also indicate the need for a higher-order extension of the TPTP library in which alternative higher-order problem formalisations are linked with their first-order counterparts so that first-order theorem provers can be evaluated against higher-order systems (and vice versa)-such an extension of the TPTP library to higher-order logic is currently under way.
Future work is to investigate how far our approach scales up to more complex problems and more advanced mathematical theories. In less trivial settings, as discussed in this paper, we will face the problem of selecting and adding relevant lemmas to avoid immediate reduction to first principles and to appropriately instantiate set variables. Relevant related work for this setting is Bishop's approach to selectively expand definitions as presented in [12] and Brown's PhD thesis on set comprehension in Church's type theory [15] .
Appendix A. Testing the generic integration
The following tables contain the data relevant to the experiments on set statements described in Section 3. Tables A.1 and A.2 contain the problem formulations of the unconditional statements. Tables A.3, A.4 and A.5 contain the detailed results of the experiments with VAMPIRE, PARADOX, and OANTS applied to the statements without conditions, with uniqueness condition and with disjointness condition, respectively. All experiments were run on a PC with four 2.4 GHz Xeon CPU and 4 GB of memory running Linux.
In Tables A.3 -A.5 all timings are given in seconds, where t/o means time out after 120 seconds and < .1 means that the time was below the measurability of the operating system. For problems that the system was not expected to solve, that is, invalid problems for VAMPIRE or valid problems for PARADOX, the table will always have a t/o entry although the systems occasionally detected the invalidity or validity, respectively. The VAMPIRE column contains the number of clauses generated during proof search. The PARADOX column contains the minimal size of model needed to refute a conjecture. Finally, the OANTS column gives first the nature of the result, that is, proof or counterexample (Ctrex.), depending on the validity of the statement, the time OANTS needed, and the number of reasoning steps OANTS had to perform before either VAMPIRE or PARADOX could discharge the problem. Observe that in some cases, OANTS needs two steps, despite PARADOX or VAMPIRE being able to solve the initial problem in insignificant time. This is due to possible communication delays via the networked file system, and a second run might yield a slightly different result.
